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Both the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.1  These protections have 
been further honed through case law that works to define what sort 
of search is deemed to be “unreasonable.”  However, as the Pennsyl-
vania courts require more detailed justification for a frisk of a person, 
police are countering with increasingly vague and amorphous de-
scriptions of suspicious behavior that work to justify an invasion of 
privacy.  What starts as an investigation quickly devolves into a police 
officer going into the pockets of an otherwise law-abiding citizen on a 
fishing expedition that results in the officer retrieving small packets 
of drugs.  Because the justifications given are vague and hard to chal-
lenge, defendants’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures 
continue to erode. 
In Terry v. Ohio,2 the United States Supreme Court carved out a 
new category of inspection that fell somewhere between a “mere en-
counter” and a “search.”  Balancing the need for police officers to 
protect themselves, and the privacy rights of individuals, the Supreme 
Court came up with the “frisk.”  The frisk is a “limited search of the 
outer clothing” that can be done “for the protection of [the officer] 
and others in the area.”3  In order to stop someone in the first place, 
Terry requires that there be a reasonable suspicion that criminal activ-
ity is afoot.4  In order to then conduct a frisk of that person, the frisk 
may be done when “the persons with whom [the officer] is dealing 
may be armed and presently dangerous” and “where nothing in the 
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasona-
ble fear for his own or others’ safety.”5  Pennsylvania adopted this 
same law in Commonwealth v. Hicks.6 
It is one thing when a Terry frisk is done and a weapon is actually 
recovered, but in tens of thousands of misdemeanor cases in Phila-
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delphia, the Terry frisk is merely a mechanism to get into the defend-
ant’s pocket: 
[A] police officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected 
through the officer’s sense of touch during a Terry frisk if the officer is 
lawfully in a position to detect the presence of contraband, the incrimi-
nating nature of the contraband is immediately apparent from its tactile 
impression and the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.7 
Pennsylvania has adopted the same law.8  Once the officer is in a posi-
tion to do a frisk, he simply has to describe whatever he feels as “im-
mediately apparent as contraband”9 and all of a sudden an investiga-
tory stop that is designed simply to investigate whether criminal 
activity is afoot ends up with packets of drugs being recovered from 
the defendant’s pockets: in other words, the frisk becomes a search.  
As long as the police can justify the stop and the frisk, they are home 
free to recover anything that is in a defendant’s pockets as long as 
they know what language to use to justify it. 
The Terry frisk allowed police officers to do a limited search with 
less than probable cause, but it was up to the state courts to further 
define what is required.  In Pennsylvania, police officers began justify-
ing their frisks with the generic phrase “for officer’s safety.”  This pre-
sented a problem for the Pennsylvania courts, because in virtually 
every case where police conducted a Terry stop, they were able to jus-
tify an accompanying frisk by simply saying it was “for officer’s safety.”  
In an effort to limit the amount of frisks that were going on, the Su-
perior Court added the additional requirement that “[t]o justify a 
frisk incident to an investigatory stop, the police need to point to spe-
cific and articulable facts indicating the person they intend to frisk may 
be armed and dangerous.”10  Recognizing the abuse of power that was 
going on, the court reasoned that “otherwise, the talismanic use of 
the phrase ‘for our own protection,’ a phrase invoked by the officers 
in this case, becomes meaningless.”11 
However, just as police were quick to say that they frisked people 
“for their safety,” it did not take them long to adjust to this new re-
quirement to describe articulable facts that the person they want to 
frisk is armed and dangerous.  One could imagine that this would re-
quire the officer to point to things that would require evidence, such 
as describing something hard and shiny and silver that was in the de-
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 11 Id. (quoting Patterson, 591 A.2d at 1078). 
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fendant’s pocket that the officer thought might be a gun, but turned 
out to be a cell phone.  Instead, officers are using vague descriptions 
that are unsupported by evidence and hard to challenge.  Two popu-
lar descriptions that police are using nowadays in court to justify their 
Terry frisks are that the defendant (a) had a bulge in his pocket, or 
(b) made a furtive movement. 
Officers are fond of referring to the “bulge” they see in defend-
ants’ pockets that lead them to believe the defendant might have a 
weapon.  The mere reference to seeing a bulge is usually enough for 
a judge to find that the officer had a specific reason to believe the de-
fendant was armed and dangerous.  A bulge could be a gun!  But of-
ten the surrounding facts do not support the plausibility of a bulge.  
The defendant might be wearing baggy cargo shorts or pants with 
deep pockets, and the only thing taken from the defendant was a 
packet or two of drugs that are no bigger than the size of a postage 
stamp.  Despite the lack of corroboration, it is rare for a judge to call 
the officer a liar about what he says he saw, and agree that the frisk 
was not supported by reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
armed and dangerous. 
Perhaps even more troubling is the description that the defendant 
made “furtive” movements.  When testifying, this is frequently the to-
tality of the description the officer will give to the court.  It will be fol-
lowed by “as a result of the furtive movements, I feared the defendant 
might be armed and dangerous so I frisked him, where I felt what I 
immediately knew to be narcotics packaging.”  Sometimes the “furtive 
movement” will be towards his waistband, making things sound even 
more fishy and dangerous.  The problem with these descriptions is 
that they sound menacing, yet there is no way for the accused to de-
fend against such a vague accusation.  Sure, the defendant could take 
the stand in his own defense and say that he did not make a furtive 
movement, but how do you really prove that?  Judges overwhelmingly 
seem to accept the officer’s vague description as an articulable fact 
that the officer legitimately feared for his safety. 
In both these cases, police are using vague and hard-to-challenge 
justifications to be able to conduct what is supposed to be a frisk for 
their safety in order to justify going into defendants’ pockets in what 
is clearly a full-on search that requires full probable cause.  Defend-
ants are left with no way to challenge these assertions without simply 
calling the officers liars, leaving judges left to decide who to believe—
the defendant who actually had contraband in his pocket, or the po-
lice officer who was just trying to protect himself.  The result is that 
the safeguards intended to protect all of us from illegal searches are 
becoming no more than a sham. 
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